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A retrospective and prospective analysis of the west African 
Ebola virus disease epidemic: robust national health systems 
at the foundation and an empowered WHO at the apex
Lawrence O Gostin, Eric A Friedman
The Ebola virus disease outbreak in west Africa is pivotal for the worldwide health system. Just as the depth of the crisis 
ultimately spurred an unprecedented response, the failures of leadership suggest the need for innovative reforms. Such 
reforms would transform the existing worldwide health system architecture into a purposeful, organised system with 
an empowered, highly capable WHO at its apex and enduring, equitable national health systems at its foundation. It 
would be designed not only to provide security against epidemic threats, but also to meet everyday health needs, thus 
realising the right to health. This retrospective and prospective analysis oﬀ ers a template for these reforms, responding 
to the profound harms posed by fragile national health systems, delays in the international response, deﬁ cient resource 
mobilisation, ill deﬁ ned responsibilities, and insuﬃ  cient coordination. The scope of the reforms should address failures 
in the Ebola response, and entrenched weaknesses that enabled the epidemic to reach its heights.
Introduction
The Ebola virus disease outbreak in west Africa aﬀ ected 
impoverished post-conﬂ ict countries with weak health 
systems and no experience with Ebola. The location 
could hardly have been worse. The initial outbreak 
occurred near Guinea’s border with Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, enabling rapid transnational spread. Unsafe 
burial practices became “underground transmission 
chains”,1 and, for the ﬁ rst time, the virus became 
embedded in congested urban areas.
The unfamiliarity of Ebola delayed its detection. In 
December, 2013, Ebola ﬁ rst appeared in a 2-year-old 
child,2 but Guinean health oﬃ  cials misdiagnosed initial 
cases and Ebola was not conﬁ rmed in Guinea until 
March 21, 2014, and in Liberia 2 days later (see ﬁ gure 
appendix).3 In Sierra Leone, scientists suspected Ebola,4 
but their information did not reach surveillance teams 
and Ebola remained unconﬁ rmed until late May. These 
missed initial diagnoses and a second wave of Ebola that 
hit Liberia in June were ultimately linked to the funeral 
of a traditional healer in Guinea in March.4
In states rife with corruption and low health literacy, 
distrust of government and health workers was 
pervasive, and exacerbated by the early methods of 
response. Health workers arrived in unfamiliar, 
spacesuit-like clothing, frightening residents. The ill 
were removed from their communities, sometimes 
never to be seen again. In August, 2014, Liberia 
deployed the military to enforce a cordon sanitaire in 
West Point, Monrovia, provoking violence.5 A month 
later, Sierra Leone declared a 3-day curfew, a so-called 
lockdown, using it as an opportunity for house-to-house 
education. In Guinea, rumours persisted that the 
government had fabricated Ebola as a ploy to gain 
humanitarian aid.6 Patients were stigmatised, 
undermining crucial opportunities to use the resource 
that survivors could be to their communities.7,8 The 
governments’ early actions were the wrong way to 
change behaviour. Families hid feverish individuals, 
unsafe burial practices persisted, and there was violence 
against health workers, educators, and police.6,9
By late June, 2014, Ebola was conﬁ rmed in 60 locations 
across three countries, with cases rising exponentially, 
and health workers were dying in large numbers.10 Yet 
the international machinery did not move into higher 
gear until late July, after the medical evacuation of two 
US aid workers from Liberia. By this point, the disease 
had spread to the Nigerian megacity of Lagos, provoking 
fears of unmitigated disaster. The polio vaccination 
infrastructure in Nigeria was re-purposed, rapidly 
containing the outbreak.11 In the ensuing months, 
Ebola spread to Senegal, Mali, the USA, and the UK, 
but was controlled.
WHO issued a regional plan, asking the international 
community to ﬁ ll a US$71 million gap,12 the ﬁ rst in a 
succession of rising cost estimates, reaching $988 million 
in a UN appeal in mid-September.13 Controversy arose 
over the ethical allocation of therapies after several 
Americans and a Spanish national, rather than west 
Africans, received doses of the scarce ZMapp, an 
experimental biopharmaceutical.
It was not until Aug 8, 2014—4·5 months after the ﬁ rst 
international spread—that the WHO Director-General 
declared a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern (PHEIC) under the 2005 International Health 
Regulations (IHR), a global treaty.14 Yet Médecins Sans 
Frontières had warned on June 21 that Ebola was “out of 
control”, calling for a “massive deployment of resources”.10 
WHO’s staﬀ  recognised the urgency of the crisis, but 
expressed concern about the economic and political 
ramiﬁ cations for the aﬀ ected states.15 
International donations ﬁ nally began to ﬂ ow, with the 
largest contributions from the World Bank and the USA. 
Building on historical ties, US assistance focused on 
Liberia, British assistance on Sierra Leone, and French 
assistance on Guinea. On Sept 16, 2014, President Obama 
mobilised military assets—3000 troops to support logistics, 
train health workers, and build 17 treatment centres.
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2 days later, the UN Security Council passed an 
unprecedented resolution calling Ebola a threat to 
international peace and security, urging an escalated 
response and an end to travel restrictions, which several 
states had enacted.16 The next day, the UN Secretary-
General announced the UN Mission for Emergency Ebola 
Response (UNMEER) to lead operations in the region.17
Fear increased in October when the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) posited a worst-case 
scenario of 1·4 million infections by mid-January, 2015.18 
Travel bans and ﬂ ight suspensions harmed fragile 
economies and hampered the ﬂ ow of trade and aid. On 
Sept 30, public fear intensiﬁ ed in the USA when health 
workers in Dallas, TX, diagnosed Ebola in a traveller 
originating in Liberia.19 Two Dallas nurses contracted the 
virus. Soon thereafter, a medical worker returning from 
Guinea to New York City was diagnosed with Ebola.20 
President Obama resisted calls for a travel ban, but erected 
rigorous entry screening, and several states quarantined 
health workers returning from the region.21
Yet the global response was taking hold, and 
communities mobilised, leading to substantial changes in 
behaviour. By Dec 1, 2014, in most of the region UNMEER 
reached its targets of 70% safe burials and 70% of new 
patients with Ebola in treatment facilities.22 The US 
Congress passed the President’s emergency appropriation 
of $5·4 billion.23 By February, international contributions 
neared $5 billion from 70 countries,24,25 although UNMEER 
reported a shortfall of nearly $1 billion through June 2015.26
The world would soon embark on the next phase of 
“getting to zero”—no new cases.27 Having peaked in 
September, Liberia’s new cases fell to fewer than ten per 
week in January, with one new case in March. After a 
spike in November and December, new cases in Sierra 
Leone declined signiﬁ cantly, with progress in Guinea, 
although distrust continued to hinder the response 
there.28,29 Until there are zero cases, the epidemic is not 
over. Reasonable concerns persist that Ebola could become 
endemic in Guinea and Sierra Leone, or re-emerge in 
Liberia. There remains the crucial task of recovery and 
development, because Ebola has devastated the region.
A new global health framework
The Ebola epidemic revealed a fragmented global health 
system: an ad hoc series of institutions, laws, and 
strategies that do not function as a coherent whole. Ebola-
aﬀ ected countries had neither the health infrastructure 
nor specialised capacity to respond. WHO fell short of its 
leadership responsibilities,30 and the IHR—the governing 
legal framework—displayed deﬁ ciencies. Health workers 
and funding needed immediately instead arrived slowly 
and unpredictably.
Drawing on the lessons of Ebola, we propose a global 
health framework with robust national health systems at 
its foundation and an empowered WHO at its apex, well 
coordinated funding and actions from many parties, 
eﬀ ective legal methods to establish clear accountability, 
and shared responsibility to build core capacities. 
Although our lens is pandemic preparedness, system 
capabilities should extend to the full range of health needs.
National health systems: a strong foundation
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea have among the 
world’s weakest health systems, shown by the severe 
shortage of health workers. International recommended 
thresholds for doctors, nurses, and midwives range from 
223 (WHO) to 345 (International Labour Organization) 
per 100 000 population.31 The Ebola-aﬀ ected countries 
have about one-ﬁ fth to less than one-tenth of these 
recommendations.32,33 Moreover, health workers are 
heavily concentrated in urban areas, and in this instance 
Ebola devastated an already deﬁ cient workforce, killing 
more than 500 health workers through April, 2015.29
Human resource shortages sharply curtailed health care 
beyond Ebola. Fearing infection and without the necessary 
personal protective equipment and safety protocol training, 
many health workers stayed away from their hospitals and 
clinics, as did ill patients, fearing contagion. Short of staﬀ  
or unprepared for Ebola patients they received, many 
health facilities closed. Governments concentrated scarce 
health resources on the Ebola emergency. During the 
outbreak, more deaths probably ensued from other causes 
than from Ebola. Patients with Ebola received a standard of 
care far less than that oﬀ ered in higher-income countries, 
lacking basic diagnostics and ﬂ uid replacement that would 
have improved survival rates.34
The Ebola outbreak exposed health system fragilities: 
poor infection control put health workers at risk and 
dissuaded patients from seeking treatment; community-
based health workforces were insuﬃ  cient, and therefore 
unable to detect unusual symptoms or patterns, educate 
the community, or trace contacts; and public distrust 
reinforced rumours, impeding behaviour change. The 
Ebola epidemic taught us that recommended public 
health capacities—required under the IHR but widely 
ignored—are crucial in bringing health emergencies 
under control, and keeping populations healthy and safe.
Global health leadership: an empowered WHO
A global health leader steers the overall direction of 
epidemic response, drives consensus toward a coherent 
strategy, ensures all necessary functions are satisﬁ ed, 
and coordinates many participators. Leadership is 
WHO’s primary constitutional mission—“the directing 
and coordinating authority on international health 
work” (article 2[a]). In emergencies, the constitution 
directs the organisation to furnish “necessary aid upon 
the request or acceptance of Governments” (article 
2[d]).35 The IHR establishes WHO as the governing 
institution charged with preventing and responding to 
global health emergencies.
The Ebola outbreak in west Africa should have been the 
type of moment for which WHO was created. Instead, the 
epidemic exposed long-understood failings. Lapses during 
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the early stages of Ebola provoked justiﬁ ed criticism and 
created a unique impetus for reform. At its special session 
in January, 2015, the Executive Board embraced innovative 
reforms, though neglected others.36 The reform priorities 
below could enable WHO to become the global health 
leader envisaged at its creation in 1948, and what the world 
needs today.
Three crucial functions: technical, normative, and 
operational
Historically, WHO excelled in its technical function, with 
in-house expertise in addition to networks of scientists 
and collaborating centres. WHO scientiﬁ c guidelines 
and in-country assistance are highly respected. In 
May, 2011, however, WHO experienced a half-billion 
dollar budget cut, losing 300 headquarter jobs.37,38 WHO’s 
emergency response unit lost nearly two-thirds of its 
staﬀ ;39 the Regional Oﬃ  ce for Africa (AFRO) lost nine of 
12 emergency response specialists.4 Restoring trust in 
WHO’s unmatched technical skills will require the 
organisation to attract and retain the highest calibre 
scientiﬁ c personnel.
WHO was founded as a normative organisation 
uniquely positioned for global health diplomacy, with 
unparalleled treaty-making powers. Yet in 65 years of 
existence, it has negotiated only two major treaties, the 
IHR and the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 
WHO should exercise its constitutional powers to set 
priorities, mobilise action, and monitor and promote 
compliance with global norms.40
WHO’s operational function has been most con-
troversial, with some experts proposing a separate 
organisation to lead operations.41 Yet, diluting WHO’s 
operational responsibilities would be an error of 
judgment. No other entity can match WHO’s international 
legitimacy, partnerships, ties with health ministries, or 
legal authority. Structural reforms to support operational 
capacities would restore WHO’s most valuable yet 
diminished asset, trust.
Funding commensurate with a global mandate
As of March, 2015, Ebola was on track to cost $6 billion 
in direct expenses and at least $15 billion in economic 
losses.26,42,43 Recovery plans for Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone developed in April, 2015, total more than 
$4·5 billion over the next several years.44–46 The direct 
costs alone amount to 3 years of funding for WHO, and 
is well over 20 times the cost of WHO’s emergency 
response cuts in its 2014–15 budget.38
Inadequate epidemic preparedness funding has been, 
and will continue to be, unwise. The WHO 2014–15 
budget of less than $4 billion is wholly incommensurate 
with its worldwide responsibilities. Further, WHO 
depends on voluntary contributions for nearly 80% of its 
budget, with most contributions earmarked.38 Member 
states should act as stakeholders in the organisation’s 
success by doubling its budget over 5 years, with at least 
50% composed of mandatory accessed dues. The 
Secretariat should develop a time-bound plan to match 
the budget’s size and composition with its essential 
functions. Ultimately, member states will shoulder the 
cost—either by sustainably increasing assessed con-
tributions or in humanitarian assistance as outbreaks 
spiral out of control. They should choose to empower, 
rather than eviscerate, WHO.
Regional governance: speaking and acting with a 
common goal
The poor cohesiveness between headquarters and AFRO 
became evident during Ebola. AFRO did not convene 
health ministers or open a regional coordination centre 
until 3 months after Ebola was conﬁ rmed in Guinea; the 
Guinea country oﬃ  ce reportedly impeded aid and 
technical assistance; and Assistant Director-General Bruce 
Aylward notiﬁ ed the Director-General that international 
partners believed WHO was “compromising rather than 
aiding” the mission.3,4,47 A representative of Médecins Sans 
Frontières said, “There is no one to take responsibility, 
absolutely no one, since the beginning of the crisis”.39
A strong regional framework begins with top-quality, 
accountable leaders working constructively with 
partners. Yet WHO’s Regional Committees nominate 
the Regional Director, with the Executive Board rubber-
stamping their appointments.48 This process makes 
directors accountable ﬁ rst to their region’s health 
ministers, rather than headquarters, impeding WHO’s 
ability to speak and act as a single organisation.
WHO should return to its constitutional origins, 
whereby the Executive Board appoints regional directors.35 
A search committee would create a short-list, using 
transparent selection criteria.48 Regions should, as in 
Europe, adopt a code of conduct to guide the nomination 
process.49 These reforms would ensure qualiﬁ ed regional 
directors, well versed in their region’s priorities, but 
accountable to headquarters and committed to WHO’s 
global priorities and programme of work.50,51
Civil society engagement
WHO, as an intergovernmental agency, has an uncertain 
relationship with non-state parties.52 When dealing with 
the private sector in particular, it needs to avoid conﬂ icts 
of interest. Conﬂ ict management alone, however, cannot 
lift WHO into the modern era. The AIDS pandemic 
showed the power of civil society advocacy and ingenuity. 
To participate in WHO governance forums, civil society 
organisations must enter into “oﬃ  cial relations” with 
WHO, requiring them to be “international in membership 
and/or scope”, which excludes poorer, grassroots 
organisations based in developing countries.52 Even if 
civil society organisations are in oﬃ  cial relations, they 
cannot fully have their voices heard, which underscores 
the Director-General’s 2013 observation, “no proactive, 
structured means [exist] through which WHO can seek 
the views of relevant [non-governmental organisations].”53
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The World Health Assembly should enable civil society 
organisations to participate meaningfully in WHO policy 
making, including through hearings, focus groups, and 
input into governance decisions. Newer public–private 
partnerships (Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria and GAVI Alliance) and UNAIDS include civil 
society representation on their governing boards—a 
useful model for WHO.
Human resources
The Executive Board recognised “WHO’s human 
resources systems and processes slowed down the 
response to Ebola”,36 calling for reform of recruitment, 
training, performance reviews, and mobility policies, and 
aﬃ  rming the Director-General’s authority over regional 
and country staﬀ .36 WHO’s managerial and leadership 
capabilities need to be “valued in the same way as 
technical capability”.54 Skills in law, diplomacy, trade, 
economics, and anthropology are crucial to epidemic 
preparedness. Only 3% of WHO non-support staﬀ  have 
these non-medical specialisations.55
Stakeholders
In a well functioning global health system, all parties would 
perform functions suited to their mandate, working 
cooperatively, and supporting national owner ship. Inter-
national organisations, states, non-govern mental organ-
isations, and the private sector are pivotal stakeholders.
UN
In September, 2014, the UN assumed leadership in the 
Ebola response as WHO ﬂ oundered. For the ﬁ rst time, 
the Security Council declared an outbreak a “threat to 
international peace and security”.16 The Council’s binding 
resolution directed states to lift border and travel 
restrictions and maintain transportation links. A day after 
the Security Council resolution, the Secretary-General 
created UNMEER, the ﬁ rst UN mission to respond to 
a public health emergency. Charged with “eﬀ ective 
ground-level leadership and operational direction”,17 
UNMEER coordinated participants and adopted 
anthropological-based strategies to change behaviour.56
The UN’s historic action galvanised political support. 
By contrast with IHR recommendations, Security 
Council resolutions are legally binding, with members 
agreeing “to accept and carry out [the Security Council’s] 
decisions”.57 If UN action becomes a staple of global 
health security in the future, the Security Council could 
specify states’ humanitarian responsibilities, which could 
improve compliance. Raising epidemic response to a 
level of high politics—through the UN, G7, or G20—
could transform the global response.
The World Bank
The World Bank made major contributions, initially 
$200 million in August, 2014, with its total funding 
exceeding $1·6 billion by mid-April, 2015.58,59 These grants 
and loans extend beyond the direct Ebola response, 
rebuilding health systems, social safety nets, and 
agriculture.58 The World Bank galvanised political support 
by estimating the economic harms.60 In October, the 
World Bank’s President, Jim Yong Kim, proposed a global 
pandemic emergency facility, discussed later in this paper.
The Bank’s role in health and development is distinct 
from other international organisations. With unique 
strengths in economic acumen, ﬁ nancial sector networks, 
and disbursement of funding across sectors, it is uniquely 
positioned to mobilise multisectoral ﬁ nancing, calculate 
the economic costs of failures in pandemic preparedness, 
and develop innovative ﬁ nancing mechanisms.
States
States hold a primary duty to safeguard their population’s 
health, with a shared international responsibility to ﬁ ll 
gaps in capacity. International ﬁ nancial assistance for 
Ebola came mainly from wealthier states: the USA 
contributed more than $1 billion, with substantial 
bilateral support from France, Germany, and the UK.61 
The Obama Administration’s Global Health Security 
Agenda, with 44 partner countries, is injecting new 
resources to prevent and mitigate future health threats.62
Lower-income countries including Cuba and Uganda 
oﬀ ered human resources and skills.63,64 The African 
Union Support to Ebola Outbreak in West Africa 
(ASEOWA) sent more than 800 health workers.65 Yet 
some states imposed travel restrictions and quarantines 
contrary to the demands of WHO and the UN, hindering 
the response. In an interconnected world, every state has 
a national security interest in containing novel pathogens 
that can transcend borders.
Non-governmental organisations: Médecins Sans 
Frontières
Médecins Sans Frontières—along with others, including 
Partners In Health and Samaritan’s Purse—showed the 
importance of non-governmental organisations by 
leading the medical response and sounding a global 
alert. Médecins Sans Frontières deployed more than 
1300 international and 4000 local staﬀ .66 The organisation 
admitted 8100 patients to its eight treatment centres 
by mid-February. Of nearly 5000 conﬁ rmed cases, 
2300 survived.67 Médecins Sans Frontières organised 
community-based teams to educate the public and to 
trace contacts.68 Its courage came with a price, as 
27 members of staﬀ  became infected, mostly in the 
community.66 In future outbreaks, until health systems 
can stand on their own, international non-governmental 
organisations will remain invaluable service providers 
and independent sources of information.
Private sector
When the Ebola outbreak began, despite periodic 
previous outbreaks, no approved vaccines or treatments 
had been developed. Pharmaceutical companies had 
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little incentive to invest in countermeasures for 
unpredictable outbreaks and in poor countries. Even 
major government and philanthropic funders often 
overlooked diseases with low global burdens. The Ebola 
epidemic should change these incentive structures, with 
public–private partnerships needed to pursue solutions 
for diseases with epidemic potential, however rare.69 The 
private sector’s contribution to pandemic preparedness 
extends beyond medical countermeasures to information 
technology (eg, mobile telephones, apps, and data 
systems), logistics (eg, transporting equipment and 
supplies), and innovative ﬁ nancing (eg, the insurance 
and ﬁ nancial sectors).
International Health Regulations: the governing 
legal framework
International law and national implementing legislation 
can be powerful means for a more eﬀ ective global health 
system. The IHR, the governing instrument for global 
health security, displayed ﬂ aws during the Ebola 
outbreak. States widely ignored its capacity-building 
mandates. After the 2009 inﬂ uenza A H1N1 pandemic, 
the WHO independent Review Committee warned that 
the world was not on track to meet core capacities. 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone had not even reported 
their progress.70 The IHR contains permissive language 
on capacity building, requiring states “to collaborate with 
each other, to the extent possible.”71 The World Health 
Assembly should revise the IHR to provide concrete 
steps for building health system capacities. A donor 
conference, similar to the Global Fund’s replenishment 
mechanism, could infuse funding toward that goal.72
States disregarded not only the IHR’s capacity building 
mandate, but also the Director-General’s temporary IHR 
recommendations.14 Some governments lacked the 
capacity to comply, with the Director-General 
unrealistically, in our opinion, asking post-conﬂ ict states 
with some of the world’s weakest infrastructure and 
most poorly ﬁ nanced health systems to themselves 
ensure suﬃ  cient treatment centres, trained staﬀ , and 
protective equip ment. Other states merely chose not to 
comply, for example, by imposing quarantines and travel 
restrictions without scientiﬁ c justiﬁ cation.
The IHR should contain compliance-enhancing mech-
anisms, including independent monitoring of country 
performance and public reporting. Currently, states assess 
their own compliance and the WHO database merely 
aggregates country data. An independent certiﬁ cation-of-
compliance system, as occurs with polio eradication, 
could hold states to account. The World Health Assembly 
should update the IHR to ensure independence, rigorous 
assessment, and transparency.72 The Assembly should also 
amend the IHR’s decision instrument on when to declare 
a PHEIC (panel) to include fragile health systems, 
behavioural practices, and public distrust.
The Director-General’s sole power to call an Emergency 
Committee meeting and declare a PHEIC could be 
supplemented by an independent working group, 
regularly assessing potential global health threats, 
reporting publicly, and recommending that the Director-
General convene an Emergency Committee.34 To 
improve transparency, the Emergency Committee or the 
Director-General should provide reasons for their 
decisions, as well as a timeline of WHO’s response and 
resource mobilisation. 
Mobilising human and ﬁ nancial resources: 
preparing for a crisis
The delay in mobilising ﬁ nancing and human resources 
showed the heavy costs of a failure to prepare. Planning 
for rapid mobilisation should be combined with 
strengthening health systems to build country capacity. 
The subsequent capacity-building reforms would better 
ensure health security, both regionally and worldwide.
Global health workforce reserve
Health worker shortages, combined with the human 
resource-intense response, demanded international 
support. Yet the ﬂ ow of health workers was far beneath 
the need. In late October, 2014, part of the epidemic’s 
worst phase, there was “a huge gap” in trained workers, 
with the UN estimating 1000 foreign health workers still 
needed.73 As Ebola peaked in December in Sierra Leone, 
treatment centres still had staﬀ  deﬁ ciencies.74
WHO does not have staﬀ  to serve as front-line service 
providers, and developing this capacity would be costly 
and ineﬃ  cient. Rather, the organisation should draw 
human resources from networks such as the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN)—a 
collaboration of institutions, which pools human 
resources and equipment.36,75 WHO should certify 
reserve workforce outbreak response and health 
Panel: The reform agenda: assuring global health security
An empowered WHO
Funding: commensurate with global mandate and under Director-General’s control
Technical excellence: diverse staﬀ  with multisectoral capabilities
Operational capacities: rapid deployment of economic and human resources
Normative standards: setting priorities and ensuring compliance
Regional oﬃ  ces: regional knowledge and consistency with headquarters
Engaging non-state parties: harnessing the potential of civil society
National health capacities
Global health workforce reserve
Emergency contingency fund
Pandemic emergency facility
International health systems fund
Strengthening the International Health Regulations
Stronger state duties to build core capacities
Revise algorithm for declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern
Independent monitoring and transparency
Compliance enhancing mechanisms
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emergency competencies. Importantly, well trained 
health workers would serve their communities, 
deployed internationally only when needed to quell a 
major outbreak.
Obstacles to rapid deployment should be removed, 
such as national registration or licensing, liability, and 
visa delays. Workers should be fairly compensated, with 
safe working conditions. If workers become ill, WHO 
should ensure treatment in country or through medical 
evacuation.
Emergency contingency fund
By the end of July, 2014, WHO reported that only 
$7 million had been contributed to combat Ebola.12 Even 
when funds were promised, large gaps remained between 
commitments and disbursements.76 Funding has now 
reached billions of dollars. Yet by early 2015, there were 
already signs of donor fatigue.77 The slow initial response 
enabled Ebola to escalate, whereas political will could 
now wane during the ﬁ nal crucial phases.
The outbreak reminded us that mobilising funds only 
after a crisis hits is ineﬀ ective. WHO never implemented 
the 2011 IHR Review Committee recommendation for a 
standing $100 million contingency fund to be released 
in a declared emergency.70 The 2015 Executive Board, 
however, directed the Director-General to report to the 
World Health Assembly on more expansive funding 
needs, “the preparedness, surveillance and response 
work of WHO”.36 A contingency fund would have to 
include new resources so it does not erode the agency’s 
overall budget. In view of the experience with Ebola, the 
fund will have to go above the $100 million initially 
proposed.
A pandemic emergency facility
The World Bank has proposed a pandemic emergency 
facility to fund future pandemic response, including 
health workers, medicines, supplies, and information 
systems. The facility would frontload funds to be available 
in a pandemic, supported by long-term donor pledges 
and the private sector.78 By use of an insurance model, for 
example, states and development partners would insure 
against epidemic risks, with premiums lowered as 
preparedness improves.79 Insurance payouts would be 
triggered by a predeﬁ ned emergency event. This model 
takes advantage of state and private interests in lowering 
future risks of a public health crisis.
International health system fund
Neither the WHO contingency fund nor the World 
Bank’s emergency facility would robustly fund the IHR’s 
core capacities or health systems. Disease-speciﬁ c 
initiatives such as the Global Fund and GAVI have 
improved health systems, but remain insuﬃ  cient.
Health economists estimate that one-third to one-half 
of new health ﬁ nancing should be directed to health 
system strengthening,80,81 yet less than 7% of international 
funds are devoted to that goal.82 Without a new approach, 
international funding will not meet health system-
strengthening needs. Therefore, we propose a multi-
billion dollar international health systems fund.83 The 
Fund could be under the purview of the Global Fund, 
with an expanded mandate, increased funding, and 
governance reforms to ensure broad expertise and 
participation. States could pay dues assessed at levels 
based on UN and WHO contributions, the equitable 
contributions framework,84 or other metrics, with 
reciprocal national investments. 
Alternatively, the International Health System Fund 
could be housed under a new public–private partnership, 
including key international organisations (eg, WHO and 
the World Bank), governments, civil society, and 
communities. The Global Fund and GAVI chairs could 
be board members, ensuring synergy among the funds. 
The new Fund could borrow features from both global 
health funds, such as the Global Fund’s inclusive Country 
Coordination Mechanisms, human rights strategy, and 
focus on marginalised populations, along with GAVI’s 
coﬁ nancing requirement.
The need to act now
Action now on WHO and other reforms to the global 
health system is crucial, before the political moment 
passes. The World Health Assembly should aﬃ  rm its 
commitment to the workforce reserve and contingency 
fund, even as details may require further development. 
It should call for the Director-General to develop a 
needs-based budget, as well as options for reform 
of regional governance and deepened civil society 
engagement, with ﬁ nal decisions next year. The Global 
Fund and GAVI Board could hold a joint board meeting 
to determine the possibility of their incorporating an 
international health system fund. If they decline, the 
UN should launch this Fund, replicating its catalytic 
role for the Global Fund.85 
A global health system for all
The Ebola outbreak in west Africa revealed the 
incoherence and inequity of the global health system. 
Impoverished communities and countries suﬀ er most, 
but everyone is at risk. The west African crisis, combined 
with the post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals, 
provides a rare political opportunity for sweeping 
reforms. Robust national health systems, a 21st century 
WHO, a strong IHR with state compliance, and 
sustainable human and ﬁ nancial resources would 
transform the global health system. These reforms 
would not only keep populations secure against 
pandemic threats, but would also ensure health and 
safety for all needs through rights-based universal health 
coverage. This is a global health framework that is 
achievable in the aftermath of a tragic epidemic that 
needlessly took more than 10 000 lives in one of the 
world’s poorest regions.
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Progression of the epidemic
Most affected states (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone)
International spread beyond most affected states
The toll rises
Warnings and delayed response
March 25, 2014: WHO tweets “Ebola 
has always remained a very localised 
event”
March 31, 2014: MSF warns of an 
“epidemic of a magnitude never 
seen before”
April 14, 2014: WHO warns: we are 
seeing “tip of the iceberg,” need 
“drastic” change in course 
June 4, 2014: WHO official says 
PHEIC should be a “last resort” 
June 21, 2014: MSF warns: Ebola 
“out of control”, calls for “massive 
deployment of resources”
Aug 8, 2014: WHO Director-General 
declares PHEIC
Mid-June, 2014: WHO Assistant 
Director-General says declaring a PHEIC 
could be viewed as a “hostile act”  
Late July, 2014: MSF President urges 
WHO Director-General to declare 
Ebola a PHEIC
WHO response WHO and MSF warnings  
April 16, 2015: WHO issues statement 
acknowledging failings, then 4 days later 
issues "corrected" toned-down statement
Fear, stigma, and separation
International: outside the epicentre Most affected states (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone)
Aug 20, 2014: 15-year-old Liberian boy 
killed at protest during the cordon 
sanitaire in West Point, Monrovia 
Sept 19, 2014: Sierra Leone starts 3-day 
national lockdown to identify cases and 
educate public
Oct 24, 2014: Nurse returning from Sierra Leone quarantined 
in New Jersey, USA, later released, only to be quarantined in 
Maine until a judge found quarantine order unlawful
Oct 28, 2014: Australia becomes first 
developed country to issue a travel ban
August, 2014: Many African countries 
establish travel bans, as major 
international airlines suspend flights
Sept 16, 2014: Eight health officials 
and journalists conducting Ebola 
education session killed in Guinea 
Oct 21, 2014: USA limits entry from 
affected states to five airports for 
enhanced entry screening
October–November, 2014: Growing 
calls for travel ban in the USA, but 
President Obama resists
December 2013: Index patient, 
Emile Ouamouno, dies in Guinea, but 
Ebola goes undetected
March–May, 2014: Ebola confirmed: 
March 21 in Guinea; March 23 in 
Liberia; late May in Sierra Leone
Mid-June, 2014: >100 cases being 
reported per week
July 25, 2014: Ebola confirmed in Lagos, Nigeria (virus 
spreads to 19 more people, resulting in eight deaths 
before WHO declares Nigeria Ebola-free on Oct 20)
July 26–27, 2014: 2 US aid workers 
contract Ebola in Liberia then medically 
evacuated to Atlanta, GA, USA 
Aug 11, 2014: Ebola death toll 
exceeds 1000 people
Aug 29, 2014: 
Guinea national with Ebola arrives in 
Senegal, but no further spread
Mid-September, 2014: 
>700 Ebola cases reported 
in a single week
Sept 20, 2014: Thomas Eric Duncan, who contracted Ebola 
in Liberia, arrives in Dallas, TX, USA, but is undiagnosed until 
Sept 30; two nurses who treated him would become infected 
Sept 23, 2014: CDC warns of up to 
1·4 million cases by Jan 20, 2015 
Oct 7, 2014: Nursing assistant who treated medically 
evacuated patient in Spain diagnosed with Ebola, the 
first reported transmission outside west Africa 
Oct 23, 2014: 
• Ebola confirmed in Mali but quickly contained, with a 
separate transmission in mid-November
• Health worker in New York City, NY, USA, tests positive 
for Ebola after returning from Guinea and faces vilification, 
with case contributing to atmosphere of fear
Dec 10, 2014: As Time magazine names “Ebola fighters” 
Person of the Year, WHO reports 342 health workers have died, 
a toll that exceeded 500 by April, 2015
Dec 30, 2014: Nurse returning from Sierra 
Leone is diagnosed with Ebola in the UK
Late 2014: Cases decline in Liberia and later in 
Sierra Leone: community resourcefulness and 
international mobilisation showing results
Late January, 2015: Weekly cases fall 
below 100, but then rise, with most in 
Sierra Leone and Guinea
March 12, 2015: Ebola’s death toll 
tops 10 000 people  
April 2015: New cases fall below 
40 per week
International mobilisation
Financial need and costs NGO and private sector  World Bank  State response  WHO  UN
End of July to early-mid September, 2014: WHO and UN issue progressively higher 
resource needs estimates: WHO appeals for US$71 million on July 31 and $490 
million on Aug 28; UN appeals for $600 million on Sept 5 and $988 million on Sept 16
Early August, 2014: MSF begins largest “knowledge-transfer” in their 
history to train health workers. By the 1-year anniversary of first confirmed 
case, MSF would deploy 5300 workers and open eight treatment centres
Aug 4, 2014: World Bank 
pledges $200 million, the 
largest pledge to that point
Sept 5, 2014: European 
Union commits €140 
million
Sept 8, 2014: UK announces plan to build Ebola 
treatment centre in Sierra Leone, and a month 
later says it will send 750 troops to Sierra Leone
Sept 16, 2014: President Obama 
announces plans to send 3000 troops 
to aid response in Liberia
Sept 18, 2014: UN Security Council 
passes historic resolution calling Ebola 
a threat to international peace and security
Sept 19, 2014: UN Secretary-General 
establishes UNMEER
Oct 2, 2014: Cuba sends 165 health 
workers to Sierra Leone, with more 
to follow in the region
Oct 8, 2014: World Bank estimates that
Ebola could cost the region $32·6 billion,
a figure later revised downward
Dec 1, 2014: UNMEER targets for 70% safe 
burials and 70% new patients in treatment 
centres met in most of region 
Dec 11, 2014: Congress passes President Obama’s Ebola 
supplemental appropriations request, funding the Global 
Health Security Agenda (launched in February, 2014)
Early 2015: First Ebola 
vaccine clinical trials 
begin in west Africa
January, 2015: UN special envoy on Ebola reports 
that the epidemic has cost $4 billion, as UN 
appeals for another $1 billion through June, 2015
Jan 25, 2015: WHO Executive 
Board passes Ebola resolution 
calling for several major reforms
February, 2015: By mid-February, 
>800 African Union health workers 
have participated in the Ebola response
February, 2015: WHO reports that 
medical teams from 40 organisations 
had responded
March 3, 2015: Liberian President 
Johnson Sirleaf calls for “Marshall Plan” 
for regional recovery
March 12, 2015: UN Development 
Group estimates Ebola will cost west 
Africa $14·7–$19·7 billion (2014–17)
May, 2015: World Health Assembly to 
convene to consider WHO reforms, 
learning the lessons of Ebola 
December, 2015: UN high-level 
panel on the global response to health 
crises to provide recommendations
April 28, 2015: WHO launches Strategic Response 
Plan outlining activities planned through 2015 to 
stop transmission of Ebola in affected countries 
